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Abstract— The high penetration of distributed energy resources 
(DERs) will significantly challenge the power system operation 
due to their intermittent characteristic. In order to utilize the 
DERs as economically efficient as possible in the distribution 
grid, an Aggregator-based Flex-market is proposed in this 
paper. With the brand new notion of Flexibility Clearing House 
(FLECH), the proposed Flex-market has the ability to promote 
small scale DERs (up to 5MW) to participate in flexibility 
services trading. Accordingly, efforts to relieve the congestions 
in local grid areas, the contractual flexibility services of DERs 
are stipulated accommodating the various requirements of 
DSOs. The trading setups and processes are illustrated in details 
as well. Additionally, the demonstration diagram of Flex-market 
is also introduced in this paper. The diagram is utilized to test 
the feasibility and robustness of the market solutions. 
Index Terms— electricity market; distributed energy resources 
(DERs); Aggregator; Flexibility Clearing House (FLECH); 
flexibility services 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the future, the renewable energy (Wind, PV, etc.) and 
more efficient energy sources (CHP, HP, EV, etc.) are 
critically improving the security of energy supply by drawing 
upon sustainable natural sources and reducing environmental 
impacts [1-5]. The high penetration of distributed energy 
resources (DERs) is considerably observed worldwide. For 
instance, by 2020, the share of renewable energy in Denmark 
must be increased to at least 35% of final energy consumption 
- 50% of electricity consumption supplied by wind power [6].  
These DERs will pose a significant challenge associated 
with balance and congestion issues due to their intermittent 
characteristic. The vast majority of previous and ongoing 
renewable energy sources and smart grid projects have 
focused on assessing the technical feasibility of DERs, which 
widely concern that the improvement and innovation on 
electricity markets will play an essential role on utilizing the 
DERs as economically efficient as possible. 
Over the past decade, with the emerging new concept of 
Virtual Power Plant (VPP), people mainly emphasis on 
enabling DERs to participate in the existing market, especially 
to provide the ancillary service. The European Union (EU) 
project FENIX defines VPP as a flexible representation of a 
portfolio of DERs that can be used to make contracts in the 
wholesale market and to offer services to the system operator. 
There are two types of VPP, the Commercial VPP (CVPP) 
and the Technical VPP (TVPP). The CVPP is a competitive 
market actor that manages the DER portfolios to make optimal 
decisions on participation in wholesale markets. The TVPP 
aggregates and models the response characteristics of a system 
containing DERs, controllable loads and networks within a 
single grid [7]. In other words, the CVPP optimizes its 
portfolio with reference to the wholesale markets, and passes 
DER schedules and operating parameters to the TVPP. The 
TVPP uses input from the CVPPs operating in its area to 
manage any local network constraints and determine the 
characteristics of the entire local network at the Grid Supply 
Points (GSPs) [8].Thus, the role of TVPP in distribution 
networks is the same as the TSO’s role in transmission 
systems. 
 However, this scope maybe not accurate for the future 
scenarios, because of the primary task of TSO is to avoid 
system-wide imbalance occurring, while the executive issue 
for DSOs is to relieve the congestions in local network. In 
addition, the size limitations are often cited as another big 
barrier for small scale DERs (up to 5MW) to access the 
wholesale market, e.g. 10MW in Nordpool market. Therefore, 
we have to pave a novel way to fully utilize the advantages of 
small scale DERs - Focusing on the distribution grid, proper 
coordination and activation of consumers and DERs will 
provide more flexibility in ancillary services, which can 
enhance efficiency and reliability of distribution system.  
In this paper, an Aggregator-based Flex-market is 
proposed to give a shot for the feasibility of promoting small 
scale DERs to participate in flexibility services trading. With 
the new entity- FLECH, the proposed Flex-market will satisfy 
the DSOs’ requirements of congestion management and 
facilitate the integration of DERs into power system. 
Meanwhile, the flexibility services provided by DERs will 
expand the properties of existing ancillary services, conducive 
This work is supported by Danish national project iPower - a Strategic 
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to the security and stability of distribution even transmission 
system operation. 
II. FLEX-MARKET DESIGN 
 
The structure of proposed Flex-market and the interaction 
of the corresponding stakeholders are illustrated in Figure 1, 
depicted in the left portion of the dotted line. The Flex-market 
relies on designed Aggregators to provide flexibility services 
through DERs, which coexist with the existing market. 
Obviously, the Aggregator and Flexibility Clearing House 
(FLECH) are the brand new participants.  
 
Figure 1.  The structure of Flex-market  
1) The Aggregator: which is a new commercial player, 
who has three basic functions: 
• Aggregate and mobilize flexibility of DERs, pack it, 
and sell the services to the highest possible bidder 
with contract.  
• Have thorough knowledge of the electricity markets, 
put the right price on the flexibility services, and 
represent DERs to trade in Flex-market. 
• Paid by the DSOs for delivering flexibility services. 
From this payment the Aggregator will pay his 
affiliated DERs according to their contractual 
agreement. 
2) The FLECH: which is an independent non-profit 
driven entity, also responsible for: 
• The DSOs will make standardized contracts with 
Aggregators by stipulating service category in 
FLECH. 
• Ensure the Flex-market integrity by mitigating 
counterparty default risk, and monitors the contracts 
are being carried out more targeted and efficiently. 
• Provide clearing of all contracts traded on the 
exchange, a sort of ex post financial settlement.  
It could be further observed that, in this concise and 
efficient market framework, the supplier is DERs while the 
consumer is DSO, which inverts the roles with the prevailing 
market. Correspondingly, the new features of Flex-market can 
be summarized briefly in TABLE I.  
TABLE I.  THE NEW FEATURES OF FLEX-MARKET 
Factors Flowability 
Capital DSO Æ FLECH Æ Aggregator Æ DERs 
Power / Energy DERs Æ Aggregator Æ DSO 
Control signal DSO Æ Aggregator Æ DERs 
Commercial signal DSO ↔  FLECH ↔ Aggregator ↔ DERs 
Physical network DERs Æ DSO 
III. TRADING 
A. Trading Setups 
The core missions for FLECH are contracts regulation and 
ex post financial settlement, there are three possible trading 
setups are identified as: 
1) Bilateral contracts: The negotiations between DSOs 
and Aggregators are through individual bilateral contracts. 
However, since only DSOs know exactly where and how 
much it desires flexibility services, the DSOs are expected to 
specify the services and present to the Aggregators they are 
negotiating with.  
2) Auctions: With the increased volume in trading 
flexibility services, an auction-based setup will arise. The 
DSOs propose the request of flexibility services, and the costs 
in negotiations will be spared. Then, the Aggregators submit 
bids for satisfying the requested services of DSOs. Finally, 
the DSOs choose the available bids appropriately from the 
Aggregators, and standardized contracts are automatically 
formed according to the market-rules of FLECH. 
3) Supermarkets: In opposite to the auctions, the 
Aggregators have the initiative in Supermarket setup. 
Considering the historical data, the Aggregators will be able 
to estimate where and how much the DSOs might be 
interested in buying the desired flexibility services. Then, the 
Aggregators could propose and price various services, just 
like in the “supermarket”, the DSOs are the consumers of 
these flexibility services willing to select their favorite 
products.  
These three trading setups do not necessarily replace each 
other, but will be a mutually beneficial co-existence according 
to their own merits. 
B. Trading Processes 
Take auction-based trading setup for instance, the trading 
processes are shown in Figure 2 and depicted as follows: 
1) Posting and resposing process: As a part of the year-
ahead network planning at the DSOs, the possibility of using 
flexibility contracts will be considered. For the local grid 
areas, the DSOs can see substantial benefits in requiring a 
type of flexibility services, and then post their demands at 
FLECH with a deadline for Aggregators to submit bids. On 
the basis of this, offers will be clustered from interested 
Aggregators, and contracts are made.  
2) Testing process: All of this will be done approximately 
on a year-ahead basis. Closing to the contractual period, the 
Aggregators’ ability to deliver the contracted flexibility 
services could be tested. 
3) Activating process: Finally, the contractual period will 
come and the DSO will activate flexibility services as 
specified in the contract, if necessary. 
4) Clearing process: Since the contractual period has 
ended, settlement between the DSOs and the Aggregators will 
be carried out and the mutual contractual obligations have 
been completed. 
 
Figure 2.  The trading processes of Flex-market 
IV. THE FLEXIBILITY SERVICES 
With the high penetration of DERs and rapid growth of 
smart grid projects, congestion becomes one of the most 
challenging operation issues in distribution network. 
Generally, the main congestion managements could be 
classified as follows: 
1) Feeder overload: The high power flow over feeder 
capacity-limit, which may be caused by regular growth in 
electricity consumption, active reserve capacity in the grid, 
activation of regulating power for the TSO, very low prices of 
electricity.  
2) Feeder voltage: The variations of voltage and issues of 
reactive power can be exceed the band of feeder deviation 
limits, which normally caused by local generations and 
demand.  
Accordingly, aiming to explore new solutions for DSO’s 
congestion managements, several contractual flexibility 
services offered by Aggregators are defined in this paper, 
listed in TABLE II.  
TABLE II.  DER’S CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY SERVICE 
Service 
Congestion management 
Overload Voltage 
PowerCut Planned predictable peak load - 
PowerCut Urgent urgent regulation - 
PowerReserve reserve capacity - 
PowerCap capacity limits - 
PowerMax DERs limits - 
VoltageSupport - deviation limits 
VarSupport - reactive power limits 
 
A. Overload Management 
In order to satisfy DSOs’ requirements of feeder overload 
management, five types of flexibility services feasibly 
provided by Aggregators are defined in this paper, see solid 
lines in Figure 3-a)~e), namely, 
• PowerCut Planned is used to handle the predictable 
peak loads for periodically daily capacity issues, e.g. 
during the winter, the distributions grids usually 
experience the highest loads. If the hourly load 
patterns could be forecasted at each feeder, then the 
DSOs will desire the load reduction (ΔP) service from 
Aggregators hour-by-hour.  
• PowerCut Urgent is an event-based flexibility 
service, which looks similar to PowerCut Planned, 
but will be less frequently activated every day during 
the contract period.  
• PowerReserve will be able to exploit the new reserve-
supply within the limits of 70%~100%, on the 
perspective of DSOs. Moreover, in view of un-locking 
this expansion of available capacity, it is necessary to 
reduce loads when facing a reserve-supply situation. 
However, this sort of flexibility service will be rarely 
activated as it will only be served when a feeder get 
faulted plus the load exceeding the 70% capacity limit 
during the exactly hours of a year. 
• PowerCap will pledge a feeder capacity limit 
specified by the DSOs will not be violated. 
• PowerMax is suitable for the DSOs to make it clearly 
that the Aggregators obligate to guarantee their local 
portfolio will not exceed a certain quantity. Besides, 
the DSOs need to make qualified consumption 
prognosis of both managed and unmanaged loads, to 
alert unmanaged loads will not alter consumption 
pattern. 
e) PowerMax
a) PowerCut Planned b) PowerCut Urgent
c) PowerReserve d) PowerCap
Overload
Congestion management 
through flexibility service
 
Figure 3.  Flexibility services of Aggregators for overload management 
B. Voltage Management 
In regard of serving the DSOs with voltage stability 
support, there are two flexibility services of Aggregators could 
offer to ensure that the respective feeders stay within a proper 
voltage band, e.g. ±10%. 
• VoltageSupport will specified by DSOs in different 
voltage levels with the best knowledge of grid state, 
and the contracted Aggregators have to ensure these 
voltages will not beyond the limits. 
• VarSupport mobilizes the Aggregators to cooperate 
with the reactive power control of DSOs, primarily for 
the voltage of transformers to be maintained in the 
particular limits. This flexibility service will reduce 
the expenses on purchasing shunt reactors or capacitor 
banks.   
C. Sample Application 
For each flexibility service, a set of contractual 
prerequisites should be explicitly stipulated to achieve an 
efficient and economic operation, including service duration, 
activations, location, trigger, price, risk and penalty statement, 
etc. Certain feeders in a 10kV distribution grid are taken for a 
sample to further illustrate the stipulations of these services, 
shown in TABLE III.  
V. DEMONSTRATION 
The Flex-market based Danish national project- iPower 
will be demonstrated in the near future, which has a large 
penetration and high diversity of DERs. 32 international 
partners will be involved in this project to test the feasibility 
and robustness of the proposed market solutions to several 
future scenarios.  
The sequence diagram of this demonstration is illustrated 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  The sequence diagram of iPower project demonstration 
TABLE III.  THE SAMPLE OF  FLEXIBILITY SERVICES STIPULATION
 Service  PowerCut 
Planned  
PowerCut 
Urgent  
PowerReserve PowerCap PowerMax  Voltage 
Support  
Var 
Support  
1  Contract 
duration  
1 December 2014 – 
28 February 2015 
1 December 2014 – 
28 February 2015 
1 December 2014- 
28 February 2015 
1 December 2014-  
28 February 2015 
1 December 2014- 
 28 February 2015 
1 January 2015- 
31 December 2015 
1 November 2014- 
31 January 2015  
2  Activations  60  40  3  40  60  100  50 
3  Size-power  50 kW 50 kW 150 kW N/A  50 kW N/A  N/A 
4 Size -energy  200 kWh per 
activation  
-  -  N/A  200 kWh per 
activation  
N/A  N/A 
5 Max. 
duration of 
service per 
activation  
4 hours  3 hours  3 hours  3 hours  4 hours  Until critical situation 
has ended (est. max. 
2 hours)  
Until critical situation 
has ended (est. max. 
2 hours)  
6 On-Trigger  Monday-Friday at 
4:00 PM  
Signal from the DSO  Signal from the DSO  Signal from the DSO  Monday-Friday at 
4:00 PM  
Signal from the DSO  Signal from the DSO  
7  Off-Trigger  Monday-Friday at 
8:00 PM or by 
request from DSO  
3 hours from “on”-
signal, or by earlier 
signal from the DSO  
3 hours from “on”-
signal, or by earlier 
signal from the DSO  
3 hours from “on”-
signal, or by earlier 
signal from the DSO  
Monday-Friday at 
8:00 PM or by 
request from DSO  
Est. 2 hours from 
“on”-signal, or by 
earlier signal from 
the DSO  
Est. 2 ours from 
“on”-signal, or by 
earlier signal from 
the DSO  
8  Geography  24000-24791 + 
25031  
27030-27791 + 
28031  
42080-46791  31080-34891  324000-324791 + 
325031  
261080-265891  108045-189125  
 
9  Max.allowed 
activation 
time  
N/A  15 min.  5 min.  10 min.  N/A 5 min.  5 min. 
10  Quality in 
supply  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min. 
per day  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 15 min. 
per day  
- Deviation in size of 
service: Max. +/- 2 
kW deviation  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 3  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 10 min.  
- Deviation in size of 
service: Max. +/- 2 
kW deviation  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 3  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation in size of 
service: Max. +/- 2 
kW deviation  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 1  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation in size of 
service: Max. +/- 2 
kW deviation  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 2  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min. 
per day  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 15 min. 
per day  
- Deviation in size of 
service: Max. +/- 2 
kW deviation  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 3  
- Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 1 min.  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 2  
-Deviation in max. 
duration: +/- 5 min.  
- Deviation from, On 
- Trigger: +/- 5 min.  
- Acceptable no. of 
unsuccessful 
activations: 2  
11  Pricing 
 (DSO pays 
Aggregator)  
- 1,000 DKK / kW = 
50,000 DKK for the 
entire contract period.  
- 10,000 DKK in 
reservation payment 
+ 1000 per activation 
- 20,000 DKK in 
reservation payment 
+ 10000 per 
- 20,000 DKK in 
reservation payment 
+ 1000 per activation 
- 1,000 DKK / kW = 
50,000 DKK for the 
entire contract period.  
- 0 DKK in 
reservation payment 
+ 500 per activation 
- 10,000 DKK in 
reservation payment 
+ 500 per activation 
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
= estimated to 40,000 
DKK for the entire 
contract period.  
- In total 50,000 
DKK as maximum 
payment for the 
entire contract period.  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
activation = 
estimated to 30,000 
DKK for the entire 
contract period.  
- In total 50,000 
DKK as maximum 
payment for the 
entire contract period.  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
= estimated to 40,000 
DKK for the entire 
contract period.  
- In total 60,000 
DKK as maximum 
payment for the 
entire contract period.  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
= estimated to 50,000 
DKK for the entire 
contract period.  
- In total 50,000 
DKK as maximum 
payment for the 
entire contract period.  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
= estimated to 25,000 
DKK for the entire 
contract period.  
- In total 35,000 
DKK as maximum 
payment for the 
entire contract period.  
- Paid at the end of 
the period, due to risk 
of alternative 
Aggregator ignorance 
of the contract  
12  Estimated 
price per 
activation  
- 830 DKK  - 1,250 DKK  - 16,700 DKK  - 1,500 DKK  - 830 DKK  - 500 DKK  - 500 DKK 
13  Risk issues  Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
- Faulted 
communication of 
trigger signal 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- Faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
- Faulted 
communication of 
trigger signal 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- Faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
- Faulted 
communication of 
trigger signal 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- Faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
- Faulted 
communications 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
- Faulted 
communication of 
trigger signal 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
Failure in supply, due 
to:  
- Faulted 
communications or 
control systems 
between Aggregator 
and DERs  
- Faulted 
communications 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
- Faulted 
communication of 
trigger signal 
between Aggregator 
and DSO  
14  Penalty if 
failed supply  
- 10,000 DKK / per 
failed delivery within 
quality limits  
- 4 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
- 10,000 DKK / per 
failed delivery within 
quality limits  
- 4 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
- 20,000 DKK on 1st 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 2 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
- 15,000 DKK on 1st 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 25,000 DKK on 1st 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 3 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
- 10,000 DKK / per 
failed delivery within 
quality limits  
- 4 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
(Average value of 
life-time reduction of 
components etc. + 
administration + 
mobile power plants)  
- 15,000 DKK on 1st 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 25,000 DKK on 2nc 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 3 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
- 10,000 DKK on 1st 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 15,000 DKK on 2nc 
failure in delivery 
within quality limits  
- 3 times of failed 
delivery 
Æ termination of 
the contract  
15  Other    Reference signal: 
DSO will 
continuously (every 
30. sec.) send a 
reference signal to 
the Aggregator 
during every event.  
 DSO will 
continuously (every 
30 sec.) send a 
reference signal to 
the Aggregator 
during every event.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An Aggregator-based Flex-market is proposed to enhance 
the small scale DERs to participate in flexibility services 
trading, which will satisfy the DSOs’ requirements of 
congestion managements. The typically defined flexibility 
services i.e. PowerCut Planned, PowerCut Urgent, Power-
Reserve, PowerCap, PowerMax, VoltageSupport, VarSupport 
are analyzed and described exhaustively with a sample 
application. In addition, the Flex-market trading setups and 
processes composed with the proposed notion FLECH are also 
introduced in this paper. Furthermore, the demonstration 
architecture of the Flex-market is also depicted briefly, 
conducive to test the feasibility and robustness of the market 
solutions in the near future. The proposed Flex-market shows 
its superiority to facilitate the integration of DERs into power 
system, and the flexibility services have the potential to be a 
sort of novel ancillary service as well, which will contribute to 
improve the security and stability of distribution grid even 
transmission grid. 
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